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Cognitive Scientists interested in causal cognition increasingly search for evidence from
non-Western Educational Industrial Rich Democratic people but ﬁnd only very few
cross-cultural studies that speciﬁcally target causal cognition. This article suggests how
information about causality can be retrieved from ethnographic monographs, speciﬁcally
from ethnographies that discuss agency and concepts of time. Many apparent cultural
differences with regard to causal cognition dissolve when cultural extensions of agency
and personhood to non-humans are taken into account. At the same time considerable
variability remains when we include notions of time, linearity and sequence. The article
focuses on ethnographic case studies from Africa but provides a more general perspective
on the role of ethnography in research on the diversity and universality of causal cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Scientiﬁc enquiry during much of the 19th and 20th century
searched for “weird” examples of human cognition in non-
European societies and cultures, typically highlighting extreme
departures from Western societies that were considered to be
the “standard” (see for example Porteus, 1937). A programmatic
turning point in this orientation has recently been marked by
Henrich et al. (2010) who noted that much of experimental psy-
chology (and economics) to date is limited by a sample that is
made up of “weird” outliers of a different sort, namely a sample
of university students conscripted to experiments and of similar
subjects from a Western Educational Industrial Rich Democratic
(WEIRD) background. It has become clear that a good num-
ber of foundational experiments exhibit such a bias since the
WEIRD subjects’ responses are very different from those of other
populations. As soon as subjects with a broader cultural back-
ground are included, some presumed cognitive universals (such
as the Müller-Lyer illusion) turn out to occur only in some
populations (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 65). As a consequence the
preparedness to include “non-WEIRD” groups has grown and
is increasingly considered to be obligatory, except that there is
often only a very vague sense as to what exactly such a desir-
able broadening of the sample should look like. Is it enough to
include non-Europeans who were initially only considered when
extreme contrasts were sought after? For instance, members of the
Sudanese Zande, Nuer, and Dinka, people that feature in this con-
tribution, are likely to be considered prototypical examples of a
non-WEIRD population because they live in Africa and they have
so far featured in ethnographic writing rather than in cognitive
experimenting.
However, the matter is less straightforward than may initially
appear to be the case. Although originally African people, there is
a considerable “Western” diaspora of Nuer living in the USA with
considerable economic and cultural effects on the Nuer remaining
in Africa (Falge, 2006), Dinka migrants are numerous enough to
make them a recognized immigrant category in Australia1 and
they are frequent participants in diaspora blogs2. Furthermore,
Nuer and Dinka organizations have been in the media spotlight of
recent conﬂicts and have themselves created an internet presence3,
suggesting that at least a good proportion of the members of these
groups are also “educated,” at least computer literate. Although
Southern Sudan is currently best known for its food crisis and
shortage of products, one of the main causes for this situation is
the conﬂict about the “industrial”use of oil in this country, in par-
ticular about the questionwhether thenational oilwill be exploited
via a pipeline toward the Indian Ocean (and Asia) or toward the
Atlantic (and Europe). Thus, the country is oil “rich” even though
currently these riches primarily pay for a large-scale military con-
ﬂict between Nuer and Dinka militias in the transnational ﬁght
for these resources. Finally, Southern Sudan has had “democratic”
elections. The most recent independent state in Africa has made
an attempt to democratically reconcile a Nuer-dominated parlia-
ment with a Dinka president, although this constellation is also
considered to be one of the factors in the current unrest. In a
word, the mere fact that someone is part of the Nuer or Dinka
ethnic group would not automatically make that person part of
a non-WEIRD sample since all WEIRD features are present here.
And this seems to be true more generally across Africa and the so-
called Global South where “local” people are regularly integrated
into transnational and translocal connections (Ferguson, 2006,
p. 106). It would be misleading to assume that any individual
1http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/information-in-your-language/
dinka
2http://www.cyberspora.com/index.html (accessed August 29, 2014).
3http://www.splmtoday.com/; http://www.nueronline.com/
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who happens to have a passport from Dubai, or who may be
a resident of Singapore or who speaks a mother tongue other
than English would automatically form part of a non-WEIRD
sample. The ﬁve parameters enshrined in non-“WEIRD” are not
necessarily easily operationalizable, and despite the catchy phrase
we do not have good evidence to show that, for instance, being
rich or being part of an industrialized economy or democratic
political system would in itself affect responses in cognitive exper-
iments. With regard to the Müller-Lyer “illusion,” for instance,
the relevant parameter seems to be that of living in a “carpen-
tered” environment (Henrich et al., 2010, p. 65) which is only
indirectly connected to features such as “rich” or “industrial” and
should not to be mistaken for these. Thus, the argument made by
Henrich et al. (2010) provides a rough indicator to identify likely
biases in existing samples but this can only be the beginning of
identifying the cultural constitution of cognition, including causal
cognition.
In the light of these problems I suggest an alternative: includ-
ing “non-WEIRD” people in an experimental sample is not the
only way of broadening the perspective and making research less
culturally biased. In the light of the problem outlined above, it
may in fact not be the best option. Alternatively, we should con-
sider “harvesting” existing ethnographies in a more systematic
way. By “more systematical way” I mean reconsidering the param-
eters for comparison. Up to now, there has been an emphasis
in the literature on contrasting “the West” with “religious” and
with “magical” worldviews that came to stand for “the rest” of
the world. By contrast, I will be shifting our attention to the
ascription of agency and the modes of time conceptualization
when searching for relevant parameters. There have been few
attempts to conduct“ethnographic harvesting”in a comprehensive
review way (see Lillard, 1998 for an exception) since the dominant
disciplinary strategy of anthropology is the in-depth single-case
ethnographic monograph. My goal is to steer a middle path here,
to go beyond the single-case and, instead, to explore a limited
number of accessible case studies that can provide novel insights
for current research which may lead the way to a broader review.
There is something to be said to re-read and reconsider the earlier
ethnographic literature and to discuss the relevant parameters.
Standard deﬁnitions of causality refer to the relation between
(a) an antecedent and a resultant item or event whereby (b) the
ﬁrst item has some power that necessitates the occurrence of the
second. It is a reasonable hypothesis that the deﬁning temporal
dimension of sequence (a) is affected by the cultural conceptu-
alization of time as a relevant parameter and that the deﬁning
element of (b), “necessitating with power,” is affected by cultural
concepts of agency. The purpose of this enquiry into agency and
time, therefore, is to facilitate research into the cultural consti-
tution of causal cognition without making premature decisions
and commitments as to what exactly constitutes relevant cultural
difference with regard to any particular question. A related goal is
the attempt to bring the existing ethnographic literature to bear
on questions of cognition in a way that methodologically com-
plements experimental research and that helps to theoretically
“harvest” these ethnographic sources, facilitating the interdis-
ciplinary exchange between anthropology and other disciplines
investigating cognition.
CONCEPTS OF AGENCY IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF
CAUSALITY
The ﬁrst ethnographic accounts of African people like the Zande,
the Tiv, the Nuer and Dinka were compiled in the ﬁrst half of
the 20th century (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, 1940; Lienhardt, 1961;
Bohannan and Bohannan, 1969), arguably at a point in time when
members of these communities were less Westernized, less school-
educated, less industrialized, less rich in consumer products and
less integrated into democratic nation states – while still being far
from isolated or “uninﬂuenced.” These ethnographic descriptions
have earned fame in that they constitute the ﬁrst serious attempts
to specify what is different and what is similar when comparing
the causal cognition of the European observer with that of the
ordinary members of these groups concerned. The most widely
discussed example is that of Evans-Pritchard’s (1937) work among
the Azande (Zande, pl.) where he was able to distil aspects of
their causal thinking by witnessing (and eliciting) their reactions
to everyday and extraordinary events such as the attribution of
causal agency in mishaps. The main differences that he recorded
concern not the“internal”construal of causality but rather how far
causal explanations are expanded and what entities are included
as causal agents.
Zande grain storage baskets are mounted on poles and also
serve as shady resting places for people to sit under. Occasionally
the baskets collapse and hurt or even kill people who are seated
underneath. Evans-Pritchard (1937) shows that Azande are well
aware of the role of termites in making the poles brittle and in
contributing to the collapse of grain storage baskets. However,
when people get hurt in the process, the activity of the termites are
not considered sufﬁcient but the causal explanation is expanded
to include the possible effect of the socially malevolent agency of
witches (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p. 69). Thereby Azande seek to
explain why the storage collapsed at exactly that point in time
when particular people were seated underneath. The causal cogni-
tion is expressed byAzande in a metaphor of “two spears”whereby
“natural” causes and “witchcraft” can supplement one another
like two spears hitting an elephant are considered equally causally
affective (Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p. 74). Considering two causes
with equal impact is neither weird to “Westeners” today nor was
it to Evans-Pritchard back then. Consequently, Evans-Pritchard’s
depiction in large parts underlines that Azande follow the same
logical thought as anyone else, but that they differ with regard to
the premises that they accept. The inclusion of witches as agents
is such a premise and, although Evans-Pritchard would maintain
that not all premises are equally valid, the extension of agency
to witchcraft seems to be a matter of degree rather than kind.
After all, humans universally attribute personhood (and as a con-
sequence, causal agency) to ﬁctitious entities. Legal persons, such
as corporations, companies, and institutions (such as “the crown”
or “the state”) can take political, economic, and legal action by
taking political decisions, by owning property, or by taking some-
one else to court. The emergence of such “ﬁctitious” corporate
agents in Europe is itself intertwined with religious thinking in
particular with Christian thought on the Lord’s two manifesta-
tions as Father and Son (see Kantorowicz, 1957) but the notion
that non-human, religious beings are generally endowed with per-
sonhood and agency is more widely spread. Moreover, what has
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become classiﬁed as “religious” thought in turn follows a more
fundamental “ﬁction” of imagining corporate social agents (the
kin group, the generational set etc.). In this respect it may not be
useful at all to distinguish religious from non-religious thought
since this overdraws a distinction that relies on fundamentally
similar processes (Bloch, 2013). The ethnographic evidence sup-
ports the view that a strict separation into two domains and two
modes of thought, one religious and one non-religious, is not
born out. Consider the striking similarities from the Zande and
Dinka cases in which there is a seamless merger, or more pre-
cisely a refusal to draw a clear boundary, between such domains
of thought.
“Thus, when a man cuts his foot either they [the Azande] do nothing or
wash it and bind it with leaves, and it is only when it begins to fester that
they commence to trouble about witchcraft. [. . .] In minor ailments or
at the early symptoms of an illness from which a man may be expected
to recover without difﬁculty they think less of witchcraft and more of
the disease itself and of curing it by the use of drugs.” (Evans-Pritchard,
1937, p. 509)
“A Dinka may complain of a cold or a headache without reference to
Powers as the grounds of these minor discomforts. Should the cold
turn to high fever, or the headache become persistent and agonizing,
his thoughts will turn to the possible activity of Powers.” (Lienhardt,
1961, p. 147)
In both cases there is a seamless movement from human to
suprahuman agents. In fact, both Evans-Pritchard and Lien-
hardt report on considerable internal cultural diversity and debate
amongst Azande and Dinka who would discuss whether and when
there is the need (or the justiﬁcation) to refer to witchcraft. Evans-
Pritchard reports that a potter whose clay pot cracks during the
process of burning may attribute this to witchcraft whereas oth-
ers may rather consider this a case of negligence on the side of
the potter who failed to free the clay from stones that may cause
cracks to occur in the process of pot-making (Evans-Pritchard,
1937, p. 77). Lienhardt’s (1961) reference to “Powers” in the above
quote underlines the point. He refers to the Dinka term “jok”
which refers to a wide class of ultrahuman agency. It may be
used as a noun in singular or in plural form (then referring to
distinct individual existencies of these types) but also as a more
general qualiﬁer, an attribute. So, for instance, Dinka called some
forms of European technology “turuk ee jok” (“the European is
ultra-human Power”). But they were not blurring the human vs.
non-human distinction (they would not say “turuk aa jaak,” the
Europeans are ultra-human Powers) but highlighted that agency
and humanity may overlap rather than coextend (Lienhardt, 1961,
p. 31). The subcategories of the general class jok also provide
considerable ﬂexibility. Within the category jok the most impor-
tant powers are called yeeth (which has a singular form), which
in the older literature would have been translated as “spirits,” and
these are of two types, ﬁrstly those associated with the descent
group, “clan-divinities” is the term that Lienhardt (1961) uses,
and secondly those that he translates as “free-divinities” that is
those yeeth that have proper names and who are associated with
individuals rather than groups. There are not only semantic but
also pragmatic aspects to these terms so that speakers may shift
from implying that something “is” a Power (when giving proper
names to the yeeth) to something“being an indication of” a Power
and “a sign of ultra-human activitiy” when explaining the unex-
pected behavior of an animal, for instance (Lienhardt, 1961, p.
31–32). Lienhardt’s (1961) decision to translate this as “Power,”
rather than limiting it to religious agents such as “spirits” reﬂects
the fact that Dinka shift seamlessly between what Europeans may
consider two completely separate domains, namely the religious
and the profane. For instance when confronted with a new Euro-
pean gadget for the ﬁrst time, they may see it as an instance of
“Powers” (see above) but may drop it later when realizing that it
is “merely mechnical” (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 31). Conversely, some-
thing that initially was not considered to be subject to ultra-human
power but discussed as a physical and social reality (for instance
ordinary rain or a slight illness) may be re-classiﬁed pragmatically
as jok once they become out of ordinary proportion (Lienhardt,
1961, p. 147).
“HARVESTING” THE ETHNOGRAPHY
Ethnographic evidence like that contained in Lienhardt’s (1961)
monograph has for a long time been interpreted by Western sci-
entists as a comprehensible but ultimately unwarranted and naïve
extension of agency into the“invisible world.”However, some cau-
tion is in order here. For one, dealing with causality involves the
universal problem that causation is not subject to direct observa-
tion but has to be inferred. The discussion as to what is considered
relevant in this inference has not ceased with modern science.
Moreover, the selection from a host of factors that are relevant has
not begun with modern science either. Lienhardt’s (1961) account
shows that this is not a case of non-Westeners readily accepting the
agency of spiritual beings when something unforeseen happens.
The Dinka default assumption is that there are Powers at work that
enable or disable human agency in the ﬁrst place. But among these
powers some are better known – also with regard to their effects –
than others and some remain anonymous and vague to the extent
that we may no longer consider them as identiﬁable agents, at all,
but rather as the efﬁcacy associated with a certain place or a con-
stellation (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 32). Some Powers are speciﬁcally
labeled “nhialic” which links them to the domain of creation and
what the European ethnographers would call ritual and religion
but this does not imply that the Dinka consider them“supernatu-
ral” (because ultra-human Powers are considered to be part of the
“natural” world and there appears to be no culture/nature divide
as in European science). Consequently, the term is translated by
Lienhardt (1961, p. 30) not as “God” or “Spirits” but as “divinity”
in an attempt to catch and convey a spectrum of Powers “accord-
ing to context” that are either “more substantive or qualitative,
more personal or general in connotation.” Neither of the Dinka
terms (jok, yeeth or nhialic) easily map on the English distinction
between “a Power” as an agent on the one hand and a powerful
situation where one event leads to the other without the interfer-
ence of an agent on the other hand. Lienhardt’s (1961) problem
as an ethnographer was that the two terminologies and conceptu-
alizations inadequately map onto one another. Anthropologically
speaking, however, he is struggling with a more general problem
of how to understand “action” in the ﬁrst place. Lienhardt (1961,
p. 151) writes:
“If the word ‘passions,’ passiones, were still normally current as the
opposite of ‘actions,’ it would be possible to say that the Dinka Powers
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were the images of human passiones seen as the active sources of those
passiones. The practice of divination illustrates the way in which a
division in experience [. . .] is regarded as a necessary preliminary to
human action. A diviner is a man in whom the division is permanently
present, a Power, or Powers, are always latent within him, but he has
the ability to [. . .] letting them manifest themselves in him.”
In other words, in the Dinka way of talking about causation in
terms of humans being “the object acted upon” (Lienhardt, 1961,
p. 150) is a recognition that humans are always ﬁrst and foremost
patients. They would, for instance not talk of a man catching
an illness but “the disease, or Power, always ‘seizes the man’”
(Lienhardt, 1961, p. 150) which is why, to Lienhardt, “passiones”
seems an attractive way to put it. This applies not only to divine
Powers but also to places. For instance Khartoum, when being
remembered as a place, is regarded as the agent – and not the mind
of a human who remembers Khartoum (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 150).
Similarly, there is a notion of “guilty indebtedness” whereby debt
is not primarily attributed to the debtor but the creditor (or the
Power directed by him), i.e., it is an activity of the giver, who is
considered the guilt creator (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 150).
Dinka do not treat the inner world, the psyche, the mind or
memories as interior agents that then get“extended”out but rather
as the exterior acting upon them (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 149–154).
Note that in this they are not altogether different from the ways in
which agency and causality are considered in post-Enlightenment
Europe. Dinka do not consider spirits as being materialized in
Ghosts (as in the European tradition) that can be encountered in
the external, material world and are independent of human expe-
rience. Modern science largely excludes conscious experience of
causality altogether if there is no material correlate. However, in
both cases this results in a tendency to underrate human action.
This is the case for science (see below) and for the Dinka for
whom “people do not choose their divinities, they are chosen
by them.” (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 151). When being possessed it
is “not the man but the Power” which is acting (Lienhardt, 1961,
p. 148) and it is the role of a diviner to “discover a reason for
the action of the Power” which in turn is related to actions of
the patient (sins, omissions, and commissions) which are half-
forgotten by the patient him- or herself (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 152).
In other words, recognizing as to who the agent is, and for what
reason, is not a trivial thing, at all, rather it requires specialist
attention since there are many latent elements in one’s experi-
ences and to discover which one is an indication of an agentive
Power is by no means easy, and ordinary people may actually dis-
agree on the diagnosis. They may murmur the word nhialic as
an appropriate account for why something “accidental” has hap-
pened, and as if Divinity was predictable to some degree, but
at the same time it is also fundamentally a recognition of the
unpredictability in human life (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 54). Given
this general unpredictability we may therefore conclude that ways
in which Dinka pragmatically deal with this situation has many
parallels with what “ordinary” Westerners do. This observation
has led Lillard (1998, p. 3) not only to replace the broad notion
of “Westerner” with the narrower “European American” (EA) but
also to distinguish EA from the European American Social Sci-
ence Model (EASSM). While EA, ordinary Westerners, may accept
the inﬂuence of “nonmaterial source like spirits” on the mind,
EASSM does not (Lillard, 1998, p. 3). The move, since then, from
“mind” to “brain” may make it necessary to make a further dis-
tinction between the EASSM and something like an European
American Neuro-Science Model (EANSM). The diversity within
all cultural groups, including the Dinka, also holds for “the West.”
The strategies of “ordinary Westerners” may be equidistant from
“the scientiﬁc view”as non-Europeans are. Science is less than ever
before a monolithic block.
The assumption that ordinary Europeans share “non-scientiﬁc
thinking” with indigenous people abroad is not new. Frazer
(1993/1922, p. 40) juxtaposed the Batak of Sumatra, the Baganda
from Africa and midwifes from Berlin and Bavaria, as well as
“malignant savages in Australia, Africa, and Scotland” (p. 13).
In the meantime there are good studies on so-called “modern hea-
thens” and others, usually considered “subcultures” of the West
(Rozin and Nemeroff, 1990; Luhrmann, 1991, 2012; Medin and
Bang, 2014) that substantiate this point. However, there is some-
thing peculiar here in that Westerners may in practice follow
strategies not dissimilar to those described for “magic” in non-
European settings but that in cross-cultural comparison “science”
is claimed to be part of European culture, in fact the prototyp-
ical image of what Western culture and the concept of “culture”
stands for (Wagner, 1981, p. 24). To begin with, the opposition
“science-religion” is a peculiarity of a particular European his-
tory. In other words, both “science” and “religion” as separate but
mutually constitutive categories are not necessarily to be found at
other times and in other places (Bloch, 2013, p. 32). Therefore,
“Western culture” is not to be confused with “science” but it is
deﬁned by a link between the two within a single social system
that is not universal. Moreover, that which is typically consid-
ered “magical” practice need not fall on the same side of the
equation as “religion” but rather on the side of science. Several
early comparisons consider magic to be a precursor to science,
and science to “revert” to a magical preoccupation with “inﬂex-
ible regularity in the order of natural events” after a historical
interlude of religious metaphysics (Frazer, 1993/1922, p. 712).
In a similar vein recent contributions on causality, too, consider
the “scientiﬁc” preoccupation with linear, uninterrupted causal
chains a manifestation of human attempts to install an illusion-
ary control over unpredictability and to rid oneself of unresolved
questions, ultimately an expression of fear and compulsion (see
Fuchs, 2008, p. 300). This makes some approaches in science look
similar to magical thinking elsewhere but dissimilar to both reli-
gious metaphysical position and to minority positions in Western
philosophy. In this sense we may ﬁnd a similar spectrum rang-
ing from“obsession with control” to “accepting uncertainty” both
within the cultural worldview of the Dinka as well a within “the
West.”
While it is useful to distinguish Euroamerican folk psychology
fromEuroamerican ScienceModels (Lillard, 1998) it is also impor-
tant to note that science does not take place in a culturally neutral
sphere but that it is “infected” by non-scientiﬁc ideas, for instance
with regard to the attributionof agency. For the case of modern sci-
ence, Deacon (2012) has recently shown that most accounts based
on genetics and Darwinian evolutionism in fact show consider-
able continuity to pre-scientiﬁc world views in that they recreate a
“homunculus” when giving causal accounts. Depending on the
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orientation of the researchers it is either the DNA or physio-
logical correlates of “the brain” that are attributed with agentive
power or the exterior supra-individual process of natural selection
(Deacon, 2012, p. 52). His own view is an inversion of the ulti-
mately Cartesian dualism according towhich non-material aspects
of the action-process need to be treated as being “on top” of, and
supplementary to, physiological ones. He suggests that the “unﬁn-
ished” and immaterial aspect of human action in terms of plans,
aspirations/anticipations and apprehensions is best conceived of
as an effective “absence” (Deacon, 2012, p. 23).
Deacon (2012, p. 14) diagnoses a deeply entrenched bifurca-
tion in the current “Western” perspective in which the materialist
Darwinian worldview that excludes the phenomenological reality
of human subjectivity in causal cognition brings about “funda-
mentalist” tendencies that cater for this reality but at the price of
largely negating or encapsulating the results of modern science. In
theDinka casewe do not ﬁnd this bifurcation butwe also ﬁnd vari-
ation within the Dinka as a cultural group as to how they interpret
situations in which unusual things happen. People disagree as to
whether something should be interpreted as a sign of intervention
by divinity or not (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 48). The early ethnogra-
phy suggests that a plurality of views is not a recent invention of
the European enlightenment. It is not that THEY are governed
by a religious world view while WE agonize about uncertainties.
Rather, we AS HUMANS are faced with the “uncertainties and
chances of [all] human life” (Lienhardt, 1961, p. 54). Lienhardt
(1961, p. 54) concludes that what he observed among the Dinka
was not “a pious aspiration toward resignation to the will of an
ultimately benevolent personal God” but “a recognition of real
ambiguities in experience.” However, that plurality need not take
the form of a choice between alternative views but rather mani-
fests itself as variations within a broader spectrum. There are again
striking parallels in other African ethnographies. Evans-Pritchard,
using the notion of magic that Lienhardt (1961) tries to avoid,
draws a similar picture for the Azande:
“Magic may give a greater measure of success to an undertaking than
would have been obtained without its use. [. . .] Natural conditions
and human knowledge of them, and skill in exploiting them, ensure a
harvest of termites. The use of a magical technique is secondary [. . .].
It cannot normally replace it. It is an aid rather than a substitute.”
(Evans-Pritchard, 1937, p. 467)
There is further evidence from other parts of Africa that indi-
cates that the “bifurcated” and “dualistic” solution of current
mainstream Western science is “weird” by comparative standards.
Bohannan and Bohannan (1969, p. 36) write about Tiv of West
Africa, a long way away from the Dinka and Azande: “if things
are going wrong, and you are not begetting enough children or
getting enough money or good enough crops – if things in gen-
eral are not going as well as they should – then you ‘plant’ (tim)
an itymbe mku” – a sacriﬁce to the ancestors (see East, 1965, p.
211–214 for a detailed description). When being prompted the
Tiv responded to the ethnographers that the dead parents could
not actually do (read: cause) anything for you, since theywere dead
(Bohannan and Bohannan, 1969, p. 38) but that all other things
being equal the mku ritual “is for good luck – to make things go
more smoothly. It isn’t something you have to have to get along –
but if you do not have it, there is a greater tendency for wives to
leave, children to sicken and die, your luck in hunting to be poor
and your crops not to amount to much. After it [the mku] is set up,
none of these things happens to you unless something else [. . .]
intervenes. However, any akombo [ultrahuman agent] [. . .] can
still seize you. The mku can’t stop that. It is just that if nothing else
happens to you, things will go well” (Bohannan and Bohannan,
1969, p. 39).
These passages show a number of things: they reﬂect the cul-
turally speciﬁc ideas and practices of dealing with the universal
occurrence of mishappenings, malevolence, and the vulnerability
of human life. At the most general level we may say that they are
a recognition and a measure with regard to the fact that the world
is not an ideal place for humans to live in. There are elements of
probabilistic thinking as Tiv charms set in to decrease “the ten-
dency” for mishaps to occur and for things to go wrong. There
are also elements of interventionist thinking – the assumption of
natural things such as procreation and growth to happen unless
there is intervention which in turn leads to the assumption that
there must have been malevolent intervention when these natu-
ral processes are stopped. And there are many indications for a
recognition of complex causality since measures such as putting
up ancestral shrines are not seen as “deﬁnite” solutions but rather
as supporting causes that some may want to do repeatedly in order
to increase the effect (Bohannan and Bohannan, 1969, p. 41–43).
A common bias among WEIRD people is to insist that there
are two fundamentally opposed alternative modes of access to
the environment, one religious (or metaphysical) and the other
non-religious (pure physical/empirical/material). However, as
indicated earlier, the ethnography does not support such a sep-
aration but rather one between “conﬁdence in the normal” and
“cooption of special measures” which does not coincide with
the “metaphysical/material” divide. “Conﬁdence” may cover both
metaphysical and material knowledge while “cooption,” again, can
involve restricted specialized knowledge in a spectrum that covers
both the metaphysical and the material. It would be less biased
and more appropriate to recognize that the dominant natural
science view is one such specialization which follows a logic of
increasingly reducing the range of “why questions” that can be
asked. The ethnographic context suggests a seamless spectrum of
“why questions,” ranging from the personal and the everyday (such
as: “why did I catch this disease or fail that exam?”) to the exis-
tential and universal (such as: “why do we live and why do we
die?”). Moreover, religious practices and ideas are not necessarily
directed toward control but also at what may be called “coping”
with causes, causative agents and complex causal chains. Practices
may be geared toward a better recognition (or relevation) of causal
agents and causal chains, not necessarily in order to interfere with
them but rather as to adapt to them and to position oneself in
a way that avoids harmful effects. The practice and attitude of
much of modernist science is in many ways the striking opposite.
Questions that appear to be non-veriﬁable are deleted from the
positivist scientiﬁc discourse, the question of creation (or ulti-
mate cause) being a case in point. As Schnepf (2006, p. 90) has
shown, any “why question” that is hypothetical and that involves
absences tends to be excluded from the start in favor of those “why
questions” that create observable facts. Questions of causality are
narrowed down to questions of veriﬁcation and prediction to the
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extent that causality is narrowly understood purely in terms of
prediction and not of explanation, an account as to how some-
thing came about. “Why p” is made to equal the predictive “Why
was it to be expected that p?” while excluding “How did it happen
that p?” which would target the actual emergence and mecha-
nism of a phenomenon in any particular case (Schnepf, 2006, p.
92–93). Note that this narrowing down of causality to its nomo-
logical and statistical sense generates resistance within “Western
culture” including explicitly non-religious philosophy exempliﬁed
by Schnepf’s (2006) critique, hence generating at least as much
cultural diversity as African ethnographers have noted for their
cases.
What Evans-Pritchard (1940), Lienhardt (1961), and Bohan-
nan and Bohannan (1969) were struggling to express in their
ethnographic monographs indicates that we are not dealing with
a shift of gear between “profane” causal thinking and a religious
worldview. Rather they describe a larger underlying pattern that
encompasses both. It is a notion of mediation which “enables
humans to act” or of “faire faire” as Latour (1993, 2010) would
call it (see below). One of the main problems for today’s read-
ers of these ethnographies is that they tend to see and interpret
possible “other” ways of doing things and of conceiving causality
and agency in terms of those ways from which Western science
has tried to emancipate itself. The ethnographic statements are
primarily categorized as “religious” (or “magic”), which in a sec-
ularized world is identiﬁed with religious views in opposition to
which science has emerged and against which science is gaining
its own proﬁle. We may see this as Durkheim (1912). throwing
his long shadow. Durkheim (1912), it may be recalled, argued
that humans can create things larger than themselves but that
in the early evolutionary phase of religious life they mistook the
true powers of their own society to be exterior religious powers.
And since Durkheim’s times, one could argue, the so-called life
sciences claim that Durkheim and the social sciences in turn mis-
took the powers of the collective for the powers of the genetic
program of the DNA and the neural system of the brain. What
shifted in these debates about agency is the place in the chain
where “true agency” is identiﬁed. Creationists and geneticists usu-
ally differ on where to allocate agency and the “true cause” of
things. Where they do not differ is in their conceptualization of
agency as a total power, undetermined by anything prior. “Just
plain folks” may locate that center of agency at the level of the
individual, creationists at the level of some higher being in the sky,
and many natural scientists at the level of the DNA. What they
all share is that the agent is determining the patient in a mecha-
nistic way. When represented graphically as “A–>B,” there may be
considerable disagreement as to who or what needs to be put at
the position of A (and B) but there is a broad cultural consensus
that links positivist scientists and creationists, namely that they
agree on the arrow in the middle. Lillard (1998, p. 10), following
D’Andrade (1995), reproduces this consensus by conventionally
glossing every arrow between items in the graphic representation
of the European folk model of the mind as a “direct cause,” with
arrows against the linear temporal ﬂow labeled “inﬂuences” (not
“causes”).
When we come across other ways of doing things in the
African ethnography, we mistakingly align them with positions
in these current debates so that they are supposed to side with reli-
gious positions in a very peculiar secularized society. However,
the ethnography that I have presented above suggests some-
thing else. It suggests something that may be graphically depicted
as “–>A–>” whereby A could be anything, ranging from Gods to
humans and further to non-humans but whatever the As (or the
Bs for that matter), their actions are enabled by being bound into
a larger network and they are enabled by being conditioned by
attachment as hinted at by Latour. This also applies to the actions
of most ultrahuman agents who are themselves conceived of as
bound and not as completely free. They do not only make things
but allow things to happen and humans can try to side with them
and bind themselves to ultrahuman beings so that they can beneﬁt
from the things that are being made possible.
The evidence on causality contained in ethnographic mono-
graphs is also “harvested” in a different way by a (minority)
position in Western thought, most recently popularized in the
works of Latour (2010) but rapidly gaining more ground. Latour
(2010, p. 65) refers largely to non-religious examples that he uses to
make similar points about the variability of the notion of agency:
for instance the action of a speaker speaking a language (or in
his terms: a language allowing someone to speak, and the speaker
allowing a language to be spoken), a writer writing on a notepad,
a puppeteer performing with his string puppet, a cigarette smoker
smoking a cigarette. All of these can be read against the grain: a
smoker thinks he is the agent when he is smoking but there may
be the opposite description whereby the cigarette is forcing the
agent to be smoked, not completely off limits as a description if we
think of a nicotine addict. But the critical point is this: although
opposite, both descriptions adhere to a view of agents being deter-
mining for what happens, except they inverse the subject-object
relation, the position of agent versus patient. In the one account
it is the smoker, in the other it is the cigarette. The real alter-
native, Latour (2010, p. 58) insists, would be a “middle voice”
which reminds us of Lienhardt’s “passiones” (see above) and it
may also be seen as a continuation of Gibson’s (1979) notion of the
“affordances” of objects . An opposition in terms of (full) deter-
mination versus (complete) freedom produces a dualistic image
of the human being as someone who is internally free (at least
has the representation of freedom) while being externally com-
pletely determined (by society, the markets, global ﬁnance, the
genes or whatever). But when comparing African ethnographies
with “modern lives,” Latour (1993) suggests, we are not mov-
ing from a pre-modern state – in which agency is limited – to
a modern state – in which agency is liberated. Rather, Latour
critizises the WEIRD societies to cultivate a non-modern state in
which bounded agency is denied because they ignore the fact that
agency is always bounded in one way or another (in terms of role
models, kinship ties, evolutionary forces etc.). This in turn leads
to an inability to see and compare the different forms that bind
our agency and to inﬂuence them accordingly. In other words we
should concentrate on what allows us to do (faire faire) certain
acts (as Latour, 2010, p. 58; suggests). Rituals for instance are
not binding people who would otherwise be free but rather they
bind them in a particular way. If they did away with the rituals
their agency was bound by other forms, be it for instance the play
of violent powers, of majority forces or some other structured
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way of organizing cooperative action. The modernist separation
into pure agents and pure patients creates all sorts of conceptual
problems such as the search for prime or “real” causes. In the
alternative model each mediator is thought of as allowing the next
piece of the chain to become the beginning of a new action itself.
The mediators enable the successor in the chain to generate an
effect.
Latour’s philosophy shows clear parallels with the mode of
thought described in the African ethnography of (e.g., the Tiv,
Azande, Dinka) but it also helps to redeﬁne the position of these
ethnographic cases in a comparative study of causality. Earlier
readings of these ethnographies were comparisons between “us,”
the Westerners on the route to emancipation, striving to free our-
selves from all attachments that bind us, becoming free agents and
“them,” the ones who are (still) bound by attachments (religion,
kinship etc.). In this comparison the others will always appear pos-
itively strange because they claim that they can only live through
their attachments (for instance to divine beings) that allow them
to do things, thereby violating the modernist ideal to do away with
all attachments that infringe on our agency. The new reading of the
comparative ethnography, by contrast, realizes that“we”(humans)
differ with regard to the attachments that bind us in our actions
but that at the same time allow us to exist and act in the ﬁrst
place. Moreover, there are cultural differences to the extent that
some bindings are considered to be relevant for creating respon-
sibility in action, while others are not. Some individual agents
may be considered so closely bound up with one another that
they are considered to be one agent (a kinship group, a nation,
a company or corporation etc.). The non-Europeans appear to
the Europeans as exotic only as long as we contrast their real-
ity of being bound and limited in their agency with an abstract
ideal of a free agency. In the new comparative paradigm individ-
uals (and possibly cultural groups as clusters of individuals) differ
with regard to WHAT binds them. As I want to discuss in the
remainder of this contribution the conceptualization of time is an
important feature in such a comparative ethnography of causal
cognition.
CONCEPTS OF TIME IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF CAUSALITY
When “harvesting” earlier ethnographies for evidence to do with
causality, the notion of “time” emerges as a critical domain, next
to that of agency and personhood which I have discussed above.
Again, Evans-Pritchard is one of the most-cited ethnographers,
but in this case with reference to his ethnography of the Nuer
rather than the Azande. In parallel to my discussion above we can
read his ethnography as representative for a larger body of liter-
ature and, again, we can see an emerging social science critique
of the universalist assumptions of the so-called “hard sciences.”
As already indicated, Durkheim (1912) insisted that society was
the source of all categories, including the most basic categories of
time and causality – and hence the assumed importance of the
new disciplines of the social sciences. His contemporaries in the
social sciences elsewhere, especially in North America and Ger-
many, were making similar arguments based on the notion of
culture rather than society but found themselves in the same posi-
tion to the precursors of what today are the cognitive sciences
(see Bloch, 2012, p. 86). They claimed that human cognition on
time varies and that this variation can be considered a proof to
the importance of society and culture as opposed to mental or
biological nature. It is noteworthy that the ﬁrst works that made
these claims were themselves compilations of earlier ethnographic
work rather than ﬁeld studies. This is true of Durkheim’s (1912)
work on Australian Aboriginal religion and Mauss’ (1906) work of
the Eskimo. The latter had argued that Eskimo seasonality, which
manifests itself in large sedentary aggregations during the win-
ter and small and dispersed mobile groups in the summer was
so pronounced that it would bring about not only two modes of
polities (one more hierarchical and one more egalitarian) but also
two different mind-sets associated with these two seasons. Win-
ter became associated with a greater need to seek the advice of
magicians for coping with uncertainties, to conduct communal
ceremonies and to convey mythology, while summer was associ-
ated with secularism, pragmatic leechcraft, peace of mind, and the
economic and ritual autonomy of domestic units. Mauss (1906)
relied on second-hand information and his compilation has given
rise to conﬂicting interpretations, some leaning toward a form of
ecological determinism and others supporting a view that empha-
sizes the relative freedom and ﬂexibility of social forms and modes
of thought even in apparently “simple” human societies (see Wen-
grow, 2014 for a recent interpretation). Evans-Pritchard not only
had the beneﬁt of knowing the theoretical comparative work of
Mauss (1906) and Durkheim (1912) but of having the opportu-
nity for long-termﬁeld research to investigate thesematters, in this
case among the Nuer of Sudan (neighbors of the Dinka). Among
the Nuer Evans-Pritchard also found a marked seasonal contrast
between dry river villages in the savanna where the Nuer sub-
sist mostly on cattle-keeping and the wet season in which ﬂoods
force them to aggregate and retreat to the hills where they prac-
tice agriculture and focus on communal rituals and kinship ties.
All of this, Evans-Pritchard argues, is reﬂected in the Nuer time
concepts. Their “cattle clock” is determined by daily and seasonal
routines of cattle-keeping. They measure their time according to
the tasks that need to be done as required by the needs of the
animals (conditioned by the environment and the material world
at large) rather than being “controlled by an abstract calendric
system” with “autonomous points of reference” Evans-Pritchard
(1940, p. 103). This “ecological” and task-oriented time manage-
ment made the Nuer appear to Evans-Pritchard to be less bothered
with time pressure and therefore more fortunate than those living
under his home time regime. Added to this “deﬁance” of time is
that the Nuer seem to be only interested in the past as a means to
establish relative distance or nearness with regard to one another
in their kinship obligations of the present. All Nuer consider one
another to be genealogically related – as members of clans, major
and minor lineages that have branched off from another. To know
the point in time when the lineages of two individuals have split
is to know the relative distance between them, the further back
in time the split occurred the more distant one’s kinship link.
Given the importance of time in the construction of causality, it
is easy to see that reports on such “diverging” time concepts lend
themselves to the interpretation that the Nuer also have different
concepts of causality or that they invest less in establishing causal
relations, giving less importance to chronology and to before–after
relationships.
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It is not only the Nuer for which variation in time concepts
has been described. In fact, the notion that conceptualizations of
time in “cyclical,” “reversible” or other modes of departing from a
linear mode of time-reckoning have been realized elsewhere seems
to have attracted the cultural imagination. It was reported upon in
ethnographies (Alverson, 1978, p. 170), and picked up by philoso-
phers (Fuchs, 2011, p. 215) and the social scientists pursuing a
relativist agenda that challenges sequentiality as one of the deﬁn-
ing features of causal relations (see above). Summarizing these
debates, Maurice Bloch has recently pointed out that “The Nuer”
and other ethnographies deserve a more careful reading and a
more complex interpretation (Bloch, 2012, p. 91–97). He under-
lines that the faculty to live by imagined time regimes that are not
dictated by ecology or “nature,” is an important feature that marks
off humans from other species (Bloch, 2012, p. 108). This capacity
to “time travel” includes the examples already given, when Eskimo
and Nuer are “freezing” seasons into two modes of social and cog-
nitive organization and two modes of grappling with problems
and of seeking explanations. This capacity allows us humans to
make past and future events relevant for memorizing, planning
and structuring our lives. It has wide-ranging implications since
the “normal rules of time and space are temporally suspended” for
the beneﬁt of imagining alternative scenarios to the ones that we
ﬁnd ourselves in at a particular here and now (Bloch, 2012, p. 108).
However, this human ability to imagine different time regimes,
Bloch (2012) reminds us, is irrespective of the fact that there is a
before–after linear time reckoning still in place that is instrumental
for causality. In fact, it is the particular strength of ethnographic
monographs based on long-term ﬁeld research (in comparison to
narrowly focused survey or experimental work) that they usually
contain evidence of the parallel existence of these two modes of
time reckoning. Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Nuer is a case in
point. He not only shows how Nuer “imagined” genealogical time
and how pastoralist task oriented time helps them organize their
society in a way that allows them to lead complex and satisfactory
lives. He also describes scenarios and rules which show that the
Nuer take account of the linear time that structures for instance
the calculated give and take of cattle when negotiating bridewealth
(Evans-Pritchard, 1940, p. 222, see also Bloch, 2012, p. 94). Here
the marrying out of a girl in one generation will cause cattle to
be transferred to the wife-givers which in the next generation in
turn will cause an inverse ﬂow of cattle when the daughters of that
girl are married off with cattle going the other way. Irreversible,
calculable time sequences, Bloch (2012, p. 94) argues, are under-
lying Nuer relationships in the everyday and they are key for the
communication between the Nuer and for their ethnographers for
establishing enough shared common ground to explain the sub-
tleties of those parts of the time regime that are“imagined”andnot
necessarily shared culturally. On the basis of this example Bloch
(2012, p. 115) formulates some general guidelines for the coop-
eration between anthropologists and cognitive scientists which he
sees as being necessarily complementary because they target dif-
ferent levels of cognitive processes: anthropologists focus on the
cultural imagination that differs culturally while cognitive scien-
tists such as developmental psychologists focus on the level of time
and causality concepts that are acquired early in life and are uni-
versal. The full story, however, that is provided by comprehensive
ethnographies, is to recognize the co-existanceof apparently“cycli-
cal” ideas about time and an underlying before-and-after time
reckoning.
Bloch’s (2012) treatment of Evans-Pritchard’s ethnography
echoes an earlier attempt by Gell (1992) to summarize the rich
comparativematerial on the time concepts of non-WEIRDpeople.
Going back to the terminology of John McTaggart and David Mel-
lor, Gell (1992, p. 151) distinguishes A-series from B-series time
concepts whereby the former refers to the culturally harnessed
experience of past–present–future (yesterday–today–tomorrow)
while the latter refers to the before-and-after row of typically mea-
surable events . This shorthand summary of time types allows
Gell (1992) not only to distinguish the many different philosophi-
cal approaches to time but also to classify cultural manifestations,
as found in ethnographic descriptions, that either tend toward an
A-series or the B-series conceptualization.
The time concepts of the Nuer can be described in terms of
an intricate combination of these two time concepts. Their “cattle
clock” is an example of “concrete, immanent and process-linked”
time reckoning of one action or task leading to the next, at the
microscopic level. By contrast their lives at the long-term macro-
scopic level, like inmostAfrican societies documented in the classic
ethnographies, is structured by intricate social concepts of gener-
ations, age-set and other socially “constructed” units (Gell, 1992,
p. 17). The construction of a lineage and generation in a sense
“immunizes” these social units of “generation,” “age set” etc. from
the duration of time. A generation has no ﬁxed number of years
and age-sets can cover more or less years depending on demo-
graphic factors since a sizable group of young men need to grow
up to form such a ritually constructed age-set. People belong to
an age-set or a lineage not due to a speciﬁc time that has lapsed
but with regard to the cultural limits set by rituals and other cul-
tural means. The relationship between socially deﬁned “cultural
epochs” and the relationship between ancestors and present-day
people is not altered by the durational intervals between them.
However, these cultural rules do not undermine an understand-
ing of a (before–after type) preceding of one epoch before the
other (Gell, 1992, p. 22). Having surveyed both the comparative
ethnography and the spectrum of time theories Gell (1992, p. 320)
concludes that B-series time is in fact more fundamental than A-
series time but he recognizes that many of his colleagues arrive at
the opposite conclusion.
It is interesting to note that Gell (1992, p. 320), like Bloch,
advocates a methodological bridging of the gap between the mea-
suring approaches that focus on B-series time (time-geography
approaches are his example) and the anthropologists – the “cul-
tural/cognitive approaches” in his words that focus on A-series
time. However, he also gives some hints as to why this comple-
mentarity of approaches may not be so easily achieved. Since
there appears to be a direct link between debates on the concep-
tualization of time and those on causality we may transpose his
arguments from temporality to causality in the following way:
Gell’s example (1992, p. 169) relates to preparations for cere-
mony whereby the (B-series) sequence may be “Six moons pass
before the great ceremony: one moon for ﬁshing, one for hunting,
one for making gardens, one for gathering nuts, one for visit-
ing relatives, and then the great ceremony occurs.” What if, after
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6 months, the ceremony still has not been conducted? According
to Gell (1992) that is a common situation in which visitors ﬁnd
themselves frustrated in their communication with locals, either
questioning the reliability and capability of informants or assum-
ing that there is a completely different worldview and concept of
time and causality at work. It is easy to read the statement on the
right time of a ceremony as a list of causes whereby any ques-
tion on “Why is there (or isn’t there) a great ceremony?” may be
answered with reference to ﬁshing, hunting, gardening, gathering,
and visiting as causal prerequisites that lead to a great ceremony.
However, the cognitive task is not that of counting the months
and of knowing the correct sequence (B-series time) but rather
to establish whether enough hunting, gathering, visiting, etc., has
occurred for them to be considered “past” and “done” (A-series
time). This is the situation for anyone who strives for a success-
ful harvest. One relies on B-series time sequences of appropriate
circumstances (springtime, lack of frosts etc.) that need to be in
place “to cause” a good harvest (Gell, 1992, p. 173). The Nuer
who leave the ﬂooded savanna to start gardening in the hills rely
on their ecological calendar for that purpose, “causing” their sea-
sonal movement. And, presumably, at a more microscopic level
their “cattle clock”works in a similar way as an orientation for the
daily tasks for tending cattle that are necessary causes for a herd
to survive. However, as Gell (1992) – no doubt informed by his
background as an ethnographer – is quick to add, these sequences
of time events (or causal events for that matter) are not by them-
selves decisive for human action. The ecological calendar or cattle
clock may be known to be sequences that are true at all times and
for everyone. In order to act, however, I need to establish where
we are in the sequence and in that process agents rely on A-series
type time features. What tells me that it is indeed the rainy sea-
son now and indeed time to plant or to move to the hills and so
forth? The A-series time of experiencing changes from yesterday
to today or from dry to rainy season or from taking the cattle
out to bringing them back into the corral is decisive here. It is
only a sense of the current moment that enables me to act. With
reference to causality we might say that the spectrum of (immedi-
ate, distant, intermediate etc.) causes are important to know but
for taking action I also need to know which of these causes need
attention right now, which are the ones that are unproblematic at
that particular point in time, and which are the ones that can or
should be inﬂuenced at any particular moment. In Gell’s (1992,
p. 174) words: “It is the farmer’s belief that springtime is truly
here, and that frosts will not damage the growing shoots, [i.e., his
A-series time belief, TW] which causes him set to and plant his
ﬁelds.”
Gell (1992) observes that the combination of the two time
series often leads to confusion when conducting ethnography but
we may safely generalize this as a problem of “reading” cross-
cultural data. The researcher who wants to establish when a
ceremony is being held may seek an A-series answer but is actu-
ally given a B-series response or vice versa. Respondents may
repeat, month after month, that the months of ﬁshing, hunt-
ing, gardening, gathering, and visiting have to pass which may
frustrate the ethnographer who actually wants to know whether
the time for the ceremony has come, here and now. An observer
may ask Azande what caused the death of a person but will not
be given a comprehensive (B-series type) of response about con-
tributing factors such as termites eating poles of grain storages
but instead will be provided with remarks about witchcraft and
the need to ask a diviner about current social conﬂicts because
these are the factors that are relevant to clarify at that particu-
lar point in time. It is not far-fetched to recognize the different
interests of ethnographers and psychologists here since the inter-
est of the former is typically to understand the complexities of
a case situation whereas the latter may be more interested to get
at the more stable sequences. This is the “danger” involved when
cognitive scientists read extracts from ethnographic monographs.
They (like ethnographers starting their ﬁeldwork) tend to either
mistake (A-series type) comments about what is relevant “here
and now” as remarks of generality or, conversely, mistake (B-
series type) comments about what typically occurs as remarks of
what necessarily should occur in that particular instance. Exper-
iments geared toward general statements of “what causes what”
may get interpreted by the respondents in different ways and the
responsesmay be interpreted by those conducting the experiments
in inappropriate ways. At the same time, this explains an impor-
tant strength of ethnographic accounts: it is not only that they
produce statements (about time or causality) that probably could
not have been gained in any otherway of elicitation, but rather that
they provide enough context to see what type of response(s) are
made as activities and events unfold. Humans effortlessly switch
between the different modes of thinking about time and causality
but documenting these switches with regard to events and pro-
cesses unfamiliar to the observer does require considerable effort.
Both,Gell (1992) andBloch (2013) stronglyunderline that cultural
gaps can be overcome in the process. The task of ethnographically
investigating how people juggle conceptualizations of causation
across different social situations is ongoing, independently of the
question whether respondents are considered weird or not. Bloch
(2013, p. 115) insists that ethnographers and their subjects, despite
diverse explicit cultural representations, sufﬁciently share “core
knowledge that all human beings require” for getting about their
everyday life – a shared B-series, if you will that allows mutual
understanding. Gell (1992) sees the possibility of understand-
ing across “cultures” not so much in a culture-free core than in
the fact that we are able to recognize “artiﬁcial” cultural roles
(largely of an A-series type) through the principle of reciprocity
of perspectives that allows us to understand different conceptu-
alizations because we produce them ourselves all the time. We
understand the social role played by others on the basis of our
own ﬁlling in roles over and again (Gell, 1992, p. 319), exploiting a
shared human facility for “excentric positionality” (Plessner, 2003,
p. 364).
CONCLUSION
In this contribution I have argued that broadening the spectrum
when investigating the cultural constitution of causal cognition
does not necessarily mean confronting“exotic”people with exper-
imental tasks that were so far limited to a small WEIRD sample.
Revisiting a few of the existing ethnographies can provide impor-
tant insights, too, in particular with regard to differences in
establishing agency and in conceptualizing time. With regard to
agency, a careful analysis shows that supernatural agency does
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not mean that there are no universal human abilities to recognize
causal chains – but that the recognized items in these chains may
differ considerably nevertheless. The divide between metaphysi-
cal/material that is so pronounced in Western thinking may be
much less relevant for understanding cultural diversity than the
spectrum between control and accommodation. In terms of time
the ethnography suggests that a co-occurance of partly conﬂict-
ing time modes entertained by a group, or an individual agent,
is a common feature. Moreover, there are different operations at
work, that of establishing agreement about series of sequences
and that of establishing whether a state in the sequence has been
reached or completed. However, it is important to note that these
are within-culture rather than between-culture differences. What,
then, are cross-cultural differences that are likely to remain? While
this awaits further concerted research beyond this contribution
there are some points to note: the difference between agent and
event cognition, over which much ink has been spilled in Western
philosophy and psychology appears to be much less fundamental
cross-culturally than commonly assumed. Similarly, there seems to
be much less necessity to establish whether A-series time is more
basic than B-series time than long debates in this ﬁeld suggest.
Ethnographic accounts show that in practice agent and event may
merge beyond recognition and that both modes of time reckoning
are equally involved.
It remains to be seen whether revisiting ethnographic accounts
can actually correct psychological problems that have been oper-
ationalized as experiments, or even render some of the existing
questions obsolete. One major corrective that ethnography can
provide has already become apparent: against a dualistic image of
cognitive processes made up of “unconscious quasi-mechanical
cognitive processes” on the one hand and “higher, conscious
thoughts, social representations and ideas”on the other hand, that
is so common in psychological research, ethnography opens up
perspectives that integrate both and thereby reduces “weirdness”
in a number of ways. While the integration of “weird” results into
the investigation of the cultural constitution of causal cognition
is now a widely shared aim, the notion of “weird” in this context
has received a number of different meanings: initially applied to
the “aberrant” responses of non-Western peoples, it has shifted
to connote the narrow and culturally rather speciﬁc sample of
WEIRD respondents of most of experimental science. In this con-
clusion I suggest that there is, in fact, a much deeper gulf to be
bridged than the one between “Western” and “non-Western” sam-
ples. It is true that ethnographic accounts have for a long time
focused on non-western societies whereas experiments focused
on those who are culturally close to the mind-set of cognitive sci-
entists. However, any ethnography, independent of its location,
highlights the role of conscious agents both in causality and in the
analysis of causal cognition. We may conclude that experiments
and ethnography are designed to target different aspects. There
is also an element of evaluation involved and one that seems not
to have changed much since the days of early ethnographic writ-
ing in the 20th century. Evans-Pritchard, it has been highlighted
(Winch, 1964), may have been sympathetic to his informants but
he ultimately thought that they were wrong. Materialist natural
science, and a cognitive science that orients itself toward it, priv-
ileges the detection of linear causal chains (Gell’s B-series) and
considers these to be “ultimately” important. By contrast, ethnog-
raphy, or other methods that are experience-near, insist that it is
“ultimately” the beliefs of the agents about the current state of the
world (e.g., the arrival of a season, see above) that causes them
to do things. As a result there is what may be called a mutual
suspicion of weirdness. Enlightenment science is predicated on
its ﬁght against spiritualism and transcendentalism. Only things
that were materially or energetically present were considered to
be legitimate agents in causal relations following a “causal clo-
sure principle” (Deacon, 2012, p. 38) according to which nothing
comes from nothing and teleological phenomena could not set
causal chains in motion, neither at a situation interpersonal level
nor at an evolutionary interspecies level. A lot of scientiﬁc time
and energy was spent to understand “mechanical causality,” for
instance in chemistry or the meteorology, which as long as they
were obscure were routinely applied to gods or spirits to explain
disasters or whatever deviated unexpectedly from the norm. With
regard to some ﬁelds of science, in particular the inanimated pro-
cesses and effects at the microscopic level this strategy has been
very successful, so successful that it has been extended as a default
explanation for all phenomena in which spiritual or other ultra-
human agency was proposed. Almost all of the causally relevant
agents in the above-mentioned ethnographies would be brushed
away on this basis, either as cognitive errors or as correct infer-
ences that are, unfortunately, based on unwarranted, pre-scientiﬁc
assumptions devoid of their necessary material basis. The model
of mechanical causality has become the only accepted explanation
for phenomena of living and sentient beings more generally. The
assumption was that even though there are considerable gaps in
the material links and causal chains to allow for a full explanation
of life and consciousness, it would only be a matter of time when
these gaps will be closed. In the meantime, as Deacon (2012, p.
52) has recently shown in detail, the homunculi of earlier times
were re-introduced in covert forms. Activity and teleology were
(and still are) routinely attributed to “the brain” or “the DNA” as
“unacknowledged gap-ﬁllers” that in fact are markers for an unﬁn-
ished analysis that effectively bracket out what is most in need of
explanation, namely the new process dynamics that emerges with
living beings and with consciousness. Although the experience of
consciously inﬂuencing causal chains is the “most commonplace
phenomenon of everyday waking life” (Deacon, 2012, p. 33) the
detailed scientiﬁc knowledge about the physical world (including
recent advances of neural activities) suggests that plans, values
and consciously set purposes are illusionary because our scientiﬁc
knowledge about the physical basis does not make them easier
to comprehend. However, there is growing uneasiness about this
state of affairs which in effect excludes human experiential reality
and the most pressing questions related to it (Deacon, 2012, p. 34).
In other words, the everyday experience of humans, all humans,
appears to be “weird” to the dominant science model. Conversely,
a dominant science model in which the highly evolved phenomena
of subjectivity and consciousness have no room, is also positively
“weird” and inappropriate to explain living beings (Fuchs, 2008,
p. 86).
In this context the ethnography discussed in this contribution
gains particular attention: when the positive science discourse
denies agency to conscious actors and dissolves it to undirected
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processes then this is not only questioning the particular Azande
or Dinka worldview that are described here but it is also the
end to any account that would be able to handle worldviews
of human agents without reducing them to illusions. Similarly,
when the before-and-after timeline of physical processes is said
to replace meaningful identiﬁcations for “the right moment” to
do something, then this renders not only the Nuer concepts of
time irrelevant but more generally the human ability to decouple
themselves from the here and now in which they operate.
Deacon suggests that the heart of the problem is that mate-
rialist natural sciences cannot handle “ententional” phenomena,
i.e., phenomena that are causally effective (intentional, purpose-
ful, functional, adaptive etc.) but are characterized by an absence
of detectable and identiﬁable physical substrates. The examples he
gives are of very different kinds, ranging from hemoglobin and
its functions to social inventions such as money that has causal
outcomes but “no essential speciﬁc physical substrate” (Deacon,
2012, p. 27–29). But examples multiply at the level that ethno-
graphies usually tap into, namely with regard to phenomena of
treating disease and dealing with misfortune that I have out-
lined above. Here nothing less is at stake than the realization that
to a materialist science that brackets out everything that cannot
be reduced to a physical or energetic process we are, as human
agents, all positively “weird” in the way that we experience our-
selves and the world around us. In other words, ethnographies
are a constant reminder of the incompleteness of the dominant
natural science account because they are populated by agents who
experience themselves (and one another) as interfering in causal
chains when consciously deciding when “the right moment to
plant” (or to move or to burn, or whatever) has come. There is
an unbridged gulf between the highly sophisticated account that
the natural sciences could give on the behavior of termites on the
effects of their feeding patterns onto the stability of wooden struc-
tures and the questions of meaning that Azande pose when being
confronted with the physical harm that particular persons suffer
at particular points in time. Deacon’s example (2012, p. 18) of
a boy throwing a stone to make it skip over a surface of water
underlines that point: while science may be able to provide a
near to complete causal history that causes the stone to “jump”
across water (in terms of what happens in the child’s muscles
and brain etc.) it “leaves out what is arguably the most impor-
tant fact,” namely the mental image of a skipping stone that the
child may have constructed based on observing such an event
elsewhere and by someone else (Deacon, 2012, p. 19). Ethnogra-
phies typically capture these images and draw these “causal” lines
between events, e.g., the observation at an earlier time and place
together with the pleasure of seeing a stone skip over water that is
imagined by the agent. From the perspective of conscious agents
these are the relevant constraints that have led to this particu-
lar event. From that perspective the geomorphological events that
have placed the stonewhere it was found at thewater shore become
as insigniﬁcant as the feeding behavior of termites in African mil-
let storage baskets – independently of whether they are known or
not known.
At the end of the day this may be the most important use of
ethnographies in the investigation of causal cognition: the demand
for a scientiﬁc theory that satisﬁes both criteria, namely the critical
discovery of homunculi to which agency gets attributed as a con-
sequence of a lack of a better account and the insistence that
phenomena such as purpose and intention are not bracketed out
of consideration only because they are absent from the physical
constitution at a speciﬁc place and time. This may also explain
why there is less productive coexistence between ethnography and
experimental work in the way that both Alfred Gell and Maurice
Bloch recommend (see above). After all, this is not only a matter
of combining two slightly different methods, the one more quali-
tative the other one more quantitative. Rather, we are dealing with
indicators of a much more fundamental divide at the theoretical
basis of contemporary science. A mechanistic understanding of
science that is restricted to what is physically present will tend to
render the purposeful behavior of conscious agents, as contained
in ethnography, irrelevant. Conversely, a humanistic anthropol-
ogy that focuses on the reports of conscious agents will continue
to consider any advances in understanding the physical processes,
typically based on experimental work, irrelevant. Unless there is a
theoretical integration between the two spheres of life.
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